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Abstract
In the article, I critically evaluate some common objections against contemporary ap-
proaches to mindfulness meditation, with a special focus on two aspects. First, I consid-
er the claim that de-contextualized contemporary approaches may have serious ethical 
consequences (the so-called problem of “mindful sniper/zombie”); second, I investigate 
the suggestion that it may be misleading to construe mindfulness meditation as (simply) 
a relaxation and/or attention-enhancing technique, as it is sometimes accompanied by 
unpleasant, even terrifying phenomena (the so-called “dark night of the soul”). In the last 
two sections, I weave the two narratives together by putting forward the following claim: 
traditionally-minded criticisms of contemporary approaches are ultimately correct, but for 
the wrong reasons––the historical context is not important in itself, but because of the role 
it plays in confronting the practitioner with the fundamental existential questions. In this 
sense, mindfulness meditation can be conceived as an important, but not the only element 
of a broader process of overcoming existential angst, whose ultimate goal is not relaxation 
or enhanced attention, but rather a radical existential transformation.
Keywords: Buddhism, mindfulness meditation, ethics, intercultural dialogue, suffering, 
Kabat-Zinn
Izvleček
Članek kritično pretrese nekaj pogostih ugovorov zoper sodobne pristope k čuječnostni 
meditaciji s posebnim poudarkom na dveh vidikih: prvič, obravnava kritike, ki pravijo, 
da bi dekontekstualizirani sodobni pristopi utegnili imeti resne etične posledice (t.i. pro-
blem »čuječega ostrostrelca/zombija«); in drugič, raziskuje ugovore, da bi bilo čuječno-
stno meditacijo problematično pojmiti (zgolj) kot tehniko za sproščanje ali izboljševanje 
pozornosti, saj jo občasno spremljajo neprijetni, celo zastrašujoči pojavi (t.i. »temna noč 
duše«). V zadnjih dveh razdelkih se oba vidika združita v trditvi: tradicionalni kritiki so-
dobnih pristopov imajo v zadnji instanci prav, a iz napačnih razlogov ‒ zgodovinski konte-
kst ni pomemben zaradi samega sebe, temveč zaradi vloge, ki jo igra, ko praktikanta sooča 
s temeljnimi bivanjskimi vprašanji. V tem oziru bi lahko čuječnostno meditacijo ozna-
čili za pomembno, a nikakor ne edino prvino širšega procesa preseganja eksistencialne 
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tesnobe, katerega glavni cilj ni sproščanje ali povečana pozornost, temveč korenita bivanj-
ska preobrazba.
Ključne besede: budizem, čuječnostna meditacija, etika, medkulturni dialog, trpljenje, 
Kabat-Zinn
Mindfulness in the West: in the Shadow of McMindfulness?1
In the past two decades, there has been an explosion of interest in mindfulness 
and mindfulness-based meditative techniques. The number of studies on the na-
ture, dynamics, and effects of mindfulness meditation has thus been growing ex-
ponentially (from five in 1990, through 21 in 2000, up to 353 in 2010; Black 
2014). For example, cognitive (neuro)science has been diligently mapping neurobio-
logical changes in response to mindfulness meditation (Chiesa and Serretti 2010; 
Edwards et al. 2011; Tang et al. 2015), and has been toying with the possibility 
of integrating Buddhist meditative techniques into consciousness studies (Kordeš 
and Markič forthcoming; Thompson 2007; Vörös 2016). In medicine and psycho-
therapy, mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) are used in the treatment of var-
ious psychophysical disorders (from chronic pain and hypertension to insomnia, 
depression, and anxiety disorders) (Chiesa and Malinowski 2011; Grossman et al. 
2004; Sedlmeier et al. 2012). Finally, attempts have been made to introduce mind-
fulness meditation not only into educational and corrective facilities, but also into 
companies, government agencies, even military and police departments (Sauser and 
Kohls 2010; Stanley and Jha 2009). A corollary of these developments has been 
an increase of interest in certain other aspects of Buddhist philosophy (Garfield 
2015; Siderits 2007): the idea of “non-self ” (Pāli anatta; Skt. anātman) has found 
fertile terrain in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science; the 
“idea of dependent origination” (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda; Pāli paticcasamuppāda) 
has garnered attention in metaphysics, ecology, ethics, and other fields.
More recently, however, this surge in popularity has become a topic of heated 
debate in both the academic literature (see especially Contemporary Buddhism [12 
(1), 2011] and Mindfulness [6 (1), 2015]) and the scientific/therapeutic “blogo-
sphere” (e.g. Healey 2013; Purser and Loy 2013; Segall 2013). The main bone of 
contention seems to revolve around the question of whether, and to what extent, 
contemporary (mis)appropriations and (mis)applications of mindfulness medita-
tion could be said to distort the age-old Buddhist practice. In addition to media 
1 This paper partly draws and elaborates upon two of my previous papers on the topic (see Vörös 
2015 and Vörös forthcoming).
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hype and overblown claims that frequently accompany mindfulness studies (Kerr 
2014; Purser 2015a, 33), critics have been especially vocal about the dangers of the 
so-called “mystification of mindfulness” (Wilson 2014), a process in which mind-
fulness is extracted from its traditional religious and philosophical framework, 
and transformed into something more compatible with the Weltanschauung of the 
secular Western world. Throwing out such “traditional baggage” may have made 
modern versions of mindfulness more enticing to the average Westerner, but it has 
also given rise to a host of difficulties: In addition to conceptual ambiguities and 
methodological challenges (Chiesa and Malinowski 2011; Dorjee 2010), it has 
been suggested that contemporary appropriations substantially diverge from tra-
ditional definitions and practices (Gethin 2011; Olendzki 2011); that they make 
uncritical use of, and frequently misinterpret, central Buddhist concepts (Wallace 
2012); that they ignore or trivialize other (particularly ethical) aspects of Buddhist 
practice (Hickey 2010; Purser 2015 a, b); and that they therefore run the risk of 
not only incorrigibly distorting the original practice, but also of exposing its prac-
titioners to inadvertent harm (Dobkin et al. 2011). “McMindfulness” (Purser and 
Loy 2013), as these contemporary trends are sometimes derogatorily called, is said 
to have become a puppet in the hands of corporate capitalism: The revolutionary 
impetus of Buddha’s teaching has been watered down and transformed into a yet 
another self-help method promulgating uncritical, docile and subservient atti-
tudes among employees and upholders of the existing “law and order”.
The present paper aims to critically evaluate these objections, with special focus 
on two aspects. First, it takes a closer look at the claims that contemporary ap-
proaches, in trying to extricate mindfulness from its traditional framework, give 
rise to serious ethical dilemmas (the so-called problem of “mindful sniper/zom-
bie”). Second, it investigates the warnings that promoting mindfulness meditation 
as simply a relaxation and/or attention-inducing technique is misleading, as it 
neglects the fact that it is sometimes accompanied by unpleasant, even terrifying 
phenomena (the so-called “dark night of the soul”). Drawing on these two as-
pects, I then go on to argue that the most vocal critics are ultimately right, but for 
the wrong reasons––the historical context from which personal mindfulness-based 
practices have been extricated is not important in itself, but because of the role 
it plays in confronting the practitioner with fundamental existential questions. 
In this sense, mindfulness meditation can be construed an important, but by no 
means the only element of a broader process of overcoming existential angst, 
whose goal is not (only) calmness or (let alone) optimization of productivity, but 
rather a radical (and even tortuous) existential transformation.
62 Sebastjan Vörös: Sitting with the Demons...
Modern Samurais and Ninja Warriors: on the Popularization of 
Mindfulness
Let us begin with a brief exposition of a historical narrative against which con-
temporary criticism is usually set, namely that of “Buddhist Modernism”, some-
times also termed “Protestant Buddhism” (Lopez 2002; McMahan 2008; Sharf 
1995, 2014a). The term designates new forms of Buddhism that are said to have 
emerged approximately 150 years ago in South-East and East Asia out of an 
engagement with Western modernity and a concomitant reaction against the “ob-
scurantism” of older (i.e., more traditional) Buddhist traditions. The intellectual 
elites in the colonized or semi-colonized Asian countries, swayed by the popular 
Western political, social and intellectual currents (from nationalism and (neo)ro-
manticism, through theosophy and modern forms of Christianity, to rationalism 
and modern science), set out to recover their own cultural, religious and philo-
sophical heritage by purging it of all “inauthentic” (“superstitious”, “dogmatic”, 
“irrational”, etc.) elements that might be distasteful to modern (“enlightened”, 
“rational”, etc.) sensibilities.
The reformatory zeal of Buddhist Modernism has found its expression in the work 
of many different thinkers and movements, but for our present purposes the most 
relevant among these is the so-called “Theravāda Revival” of South-East Asia. In 
their quest to recover national identity, many intellectuals from Sri Lanka, Laos, 
Thailand, and particularly Burma (Myanmar) have taken recourse to Theravāda 
Buddhism, seeing it as the traditional wellspring of their cultural and spiritual 
heritage. However, as is so common in history, the process of “recovery” of one’s 
self-identity turned out to be equally, if not even more heavily, dependent on 
“construction” than on “re-construction”, so the end result turned out to be quite 
different from the Buddhism of their forefathers. Heavily influenced by the ideals 
and values of Western modernity, these reformists are said to have refashioned 
Theravāda Buddhism in the image of Post-Enlightenment Christianity, with spe-
cial emphasis on individualism (the primacy of personal liberation), rationalism 
(elimination of all “supernatural” and “magical” elements), universalism (liberation 
available to all, rejection of the authority of the clergy), and textualism (systematic 
study of scriptural legacy of Theravāda Buddhism) (Sharf 1995, 251–2).
These aspects have, in turn, created fertile grounds for the development of the 
“Vipassanā” or “Insight Meditation Movement”, whose main goal was to (re)in-
troduce meditation into the heart of the Buddhist path. As pointed out by Sharf, 
prior to the reformatory endeavours of meditation teachers such as Phra Acharn 
Mun (1870–1949) in Thailand, Anagārika Dharmapalā (1864–1933) in Sri Lan-
ka, Migun Sayādaw (U Nārada; 1868–1955) and Ledi Sayādaw (1864–1923) in 
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Burma, the mainstay of religious practice in Theravāda tradition wasn’t meditation, 
but various devotional practices (chants, recitations, etc.) whose aim was the accu-
mulation of merit and cultivation of wholesome attitudes (ibid., 242). The “Vipas-
sanā Movement” sought to “revive” the old meditative tradition, and the method 
which proved most successful in this respect, was the (in)famous “New Burmese 
Method,” developed by Migun Sayādaw, and later popularized by his most influ-
ential student Mahāsī Sayādaw (1904–1982) (Purser 2015a, 29–30; Sharf 2014a, 
3–4). Mahāsī is said to have simplified the traditional Theravāda meditative prac-
tice––e.g., the meditator could immediately start cultivating “insight” (Pāli vipas-
sanā), without having to first develop advanced skill in “concentration” (Pāli sama-
tha), etc.––and thus made it more accessible to laypersons. Even more importantly,
Mahāsī placed emphasis on the notion of sati, understood as the mo-
ment-to-moment, lucid, non-reactive, non-judgmental awareness of 
whatever appears to consciousness. One of Mahāsī’s most influential stu-
dents, the German born monk Nyanaponika Thera (Siegmund Feniger, 
1901–1994), coined the term “bare attention” for this mental faculty, and 
this rubric took hold through his popular 1954 book The Heart of Medi-
tation. (Sharf 2014a, 4).
Mahāsī’s view of mindfulness meditation was later adopted by a group of Amer-
ican and European students, among them Jack Goldstein, Jack Kornfield, and 
Sharon Salzberg, who in 1975 founded the Insight Meditation Society (IMS). IMS 
has had tremendous impact on the reception and perception of Buddhism and 
mindfulness in the West (MacKenzie 2001). One of the members of IMS was 
Jon Kabat-Zinn, who in 1979 established the Stress Reduction Clinic, where he 
developed Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MSBR), the first and probably still 
best-known MBI (Kabat-Zinn 2011, 286). The influence of the Mahāsī-Nyan-
aponika tradition on MBSR can be seen in Kabat-Zinn’s classical definition of 
mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way; on purpose, in the present 
moment, and non-judgmentally” (ibid. 2014, 4).
From here on, we are faced with a familiar story: mindfulness, construed as “a 
kind of nonelaborative, non-judgmental, present-centered awareness in which 
each thought, feeling or sensation that arises in the attentional field is acknowl-
edged and accepted as it is” (Bishop et al. 2004, 232), soon became an integral part 
of several other MBIs2, and has gradually started seeping into Western societies 
2 In addition to MSBR, the three arguably most famous MBIs would be Mindfulness-Based Cog-
nitive Therapy (MBCT), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), and Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) (see Chiesa and Malinowski 2011).
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at large. In addition to its original (i.e., therapeutic) setting, attempts have been 
made to incorporate it into educational and corrective facilities, companies, and––
the point that critics find particularly worrisome––the army and police. For exam-
ple, drawing inspiration from Kabat-Zinn’s MSBR, Elisabeth Stanley developed 
what is now called Mindfulness-Based Fitness Training (MMFT or M-Fit), an 
eight-week meditation course that is taught to soldiers prior to their deployment 
in order to equip them with “mental armour” against emotional and cognitive 
breakdown (Purser 2014). Similarly, more and more traders, managers, and the 
like now turn to mindfulness meditation in order to “fine-tune their brains” and 
“up their game”, sometimes referring to themselves as the “new samurais” or “ninja 
warriors” (Burton and Effinger in Purser 2015a, 41). As suggested in the previous 
section, these recent developments triggered what Segall (2013) terms a “Thermi-
dorian reaction”, whose two aspects––the neglect of a broader (particularly ethi-
cal) framework and challenging psycho-physical phenomena––will be the topics 
of the next two sections, respectively. Before proceeding to these matters, however, 
two brief comments are in order.
First, Purser (2015a, 29–30), himself a fierce critic of contemporary approaches 
to mindfulness, points out several historical inaccuracies in the classical account 
of the genesis of Vipassanā Movement. Not only have both Migun and Mahāsī 
Sayādaw incorporated rituals (chanting, invocations, etc.) into their meditation 
courses, but it also erroneous to accuse them of having made up the “bare insight” 
method, as the latter can already be found “in the Visuddhimagga and the Pāli 
commentaries” (ibid., 30). Moreover, Ledi and Mahāsī, who were both well-versed 
in classical Pāli texts, insisted that meditative practice needs firm textual ground-
ing; thus, according to Mahāsi, the bare awareness of the present constitutes only 
the beginning of meditative practice, which later follows the classical stages of 
insight as laid out in the Pāli cannon. Secondly, and in opposition to the claims 
put forward by some of his contemporary critics, Kabat-Zinn did not base his 
interpretation of mindfulness exclusively on the “New Burmese Method”, but was 
also greatly influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly Zen, as well as cer-
tain Yogic traditions and the teachings of J. Krishnamurti and Ramana Maharshi 
(Kabat-Zinn 2011, 289). Claiming that he distorted and/or diluted the historical 
Buddhist method is thus problematic, as it was clear that what he sought was not 
a faithful replica, but an effective amalgam (more on this in the last section). All 
this goes to show that there are several lacunae in the “Buddhist Modernism” hy-
pothesis, which should therefore be taken cum grano salis.
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Of Mindful Snipers and Zombies: Mindfulness and Ethics
We can now move on to the discussion about the relationship between mind-
fulness and ethics, which I will present here in the form of a series of back-and-
forth exchanges, pro et contra. To begin with, it is claimed by the more traditional-
ly-minded critics that, in order to be able to attain the appropriate understanding 
of mindfulness, one must take into account the broader context in which it had 
emerged (Monteiro et al. 2015, 2–3). This context is said to be largely determined 
by the Four Noble Truths (Pāli cattāri ariyasaccāni): (1) human existence is charac-
terized by suffering or unpleasantness (Pāli dukkha); (2) the origin of suffering is 
craving or desire (Pāli taṇhā); (3) the cessation of suffering is attainable through 
the cessation of craving; (4) the way to cessation of suffering is the Noble Eight-
fold Path, consisting of wisdom (Pāli paññā) (right view, right intention), ethics 
(Pāli sīla) (right speech, right action, right livelihood), and concentration (Pāli 
samādhi) (right effort, right concentration, right mindfulness). Two things are of 
particular interest here. First, mindfulness (Pāli sati; Skt. smr �ti) is only one as-
pect of the Noble Eightfold Path. Second, just like the other seven aspects, it is 
qualified by the adjective “sammā”, which is normally translated as “right” (the 
opposite of “wrong”), but actually carries a wide range of meanings: “attuned”, 
“balanced”, “complete”, “perfect”, “wholesome”, etc. (Amaro 2015, 64; Mikulas 
2015, 15; Olendzki 2011, 64).
In addition to sammā sati or right (attuned, etc.) mindfulness there can then also 
be micchā sati or wrong (not attuned, etc.) mindfulness, i.e., mindfulness which 
does not alleviate suffering, but actually exacerbates it (Stanley 2015, 103). But, as 
pointed out by Sharf, there seems to be very little that is “bare” or “non-judgmen-
tal” in traditional accounts of sammā sati (Sharf 2014a, 943). First off, the notion 
of mindfulness in Theravāda Buddhism preserves links to the original meaning 
of the term sati, which is “memory” or “remembering” (but see Bodhi 2011 for a 
more nuanced account). This is true in two senses: In the narrow sense, mindful-
ness is associated with working memory, and refers to the ability of the mind to 
attend closely to a given object and prevent it from drifting away to some other 
object (Dreyfus 2011, 51); in the broad sense, the ties with memory are even more 
explicit, and the term refers to the capacity to “recollect one’s larger sense of pur-
pose, one’s spiritual goals, and especially, the ethical framework within which prac-
tice occurs” (Harrington and Dunne forthcoming, 18). However, the story does 
not end here. Sati in Theravāda Buddhism is described not only as retentive and 
recollective (and therefore different from present-centered awareness), but also as 
explicitly evaluative (Dreyfus 2011, 51): it recognizes wholesome mental states as 
wholesome and unwholesome mental states as unwholesome, embracing the former 
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and shunning the latter (Gethin 1992, 39). There is, in other words, an ethical 
element inherent in the classical account of mindfulness; and this element, as we 
have seen, is firmly embedded into the traditional framework of the Four Noble 
Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, which provide it with direction, meaning, 
and purpose.
To this, the contemporary advocate may reply that, throughout history, Buddhist 
doctrine and practice have undergone numerous transformations, continually 
adapting themselves to specific social and cultural circumstances. Thus, to insist 
that it is necessary to preserve the original framework smacks of doctrinal purism 
that is blind to the ever-changing nature of things, and thus actually inimical to 
the spirit of Buddhism. Further, it is emphasized that, all too often, “traditional-
ists” fail to distinguish between implicit and explicit ethics: although it might be 
true that contemporary approaches pay significantly less attention to the explicit 
ethical teachings, one might argue that there is greater appreciation of implicit 
ethical values as embodied in the person of the meditation teacher. And since 
ethics in Buddhism is not so much about the fulfilment of duties, as it is about 
the full-blooded enactment of ethical virtues, contemporary approaches can actually 
be said to be closer to authentic Buddhist practice. Moreover, “traditionalist” crit-
ics seem to overlook the fact that contemplative practices similar to mindfulness 
meditation also appear in other religious traditions, so Buddhism cannot lay claim 
to “exclusive ownership”. Moreover, since these other practices, albeit developed 
in very different contexts, seem to have similar, if not identical psychophysical ef-
fects, it is simply wrong to maintain that the Buddhist context is indispensable for 
them (McCown 2013; Monteiro et al. 2015, 6–7; Purser 2015a, 36–7).
However, the critic might retort that, if mindfulness is isolated from its over-
all, particularly ethical, context, as is the case with contemporary approaches, it 
risks becoming seriously distorted. This holds especially true if it is transmitted 
into contexts that seem to be not only incongruent with, but actually antithetical 
to, traditional Buddhist ethics, such as the corporate world, military, and police. 
Here, the threat of misuse and misappropriation seems most acute, as is vividly 
depicted by the metaphors of “mindful sniper” and “mindful zombie”. A mindful 
sniper is someone who has acquired great proficiency in cultivating “bare atten-
tion”, but uses this capacity for purposes that are in blatant disagreement with 
Buddhist ethical standards, i.e., to optimize their military skills (Ricard 2009). A 
mindful zombie, on the other hand, is a “corporative complement” to the mindful 
sniper, and stands for someone who, passively and non-judgmentally, accepts the 
rapaciousness of the corporate world. In these contexts, mindfulness becomes an 
efficient means for cultivating a set of skills (improved concentration, produc-
tivity, stress-resilience, etc.) deemed valuable by the predominant political and/
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or economic forces (Purser 2015a, 39–40). Wilson refers to this as “laissez-fare 
mindfulness” (Wilson 2014, 194), which, under the banner of “ethical neutrality”, 
uncritically embraces values promulgated by the free-market economy (individu-
ality, competitiveness, unbridled productivity, etc.).
In reply, the proponents of contemporary approaches can offer (at least) two coun-
terarguments. First, an individualized approach to spiritual practice is not a con-
temporary gimmick, but an integral part of the Buddhist tradition. For instance, 
the Mahāyāna notion of “skillful” or “expedient means” (Skt. upāya) emphasizes 
the importance of adjusting spiritual practice to the individual practitioner. As 
such, a given set of views and/or techniques may prove expedient for a given prac-
titioner, even if, from the perspective of a Buddha (i.e., someone who has become 
awakened), it may not be ultimately true (Monteiro et al. 2015, 6–7). A skillful 
teacher will always pay close attention to the circumstances in which the indi-
vidual practitioner finds herself and use them to her benefit. If, for instance, the 
practitioner happens to be an entrepreneur, soldier or police officer, the teacher 
will try to introduce her to mindfulness meditation within the context of her spe-
cific profession. In fact, it would be contrary to the Buddhist values of generosity 
and compassion to deny anyone (be it a police officer, soldier or entrepreneur) 
the opportunity of getting acquainted with Buddhist teachings and practice (Van 
Gordon et al. 2015, 53). Second, mindfulness meditation might make a sharp-
shooter more focused and less distracted, which, in turn, might result in fewer 
civilian casualties. Moreover, it may make the sharpshooter more keenly aware of 
the existential gravity of her actions, which might cause her to reduce the killings 
to the bare minimum, or even to resign from the army (Mikulas 2015, 16). In the 
last analysis, the main goal of contemporary approaches seems to be quite similar, 
if not identical, to that of classical approaches, namely finding creative ways to 
efficiently alleviate suffering. In this respect, the “rhetoric of authenticity” (Dreyfus 
2011, 42; Dunne 2015, 252) may actually prove disruptive for collaborative efforts, 
and may turn out to be a hindrance in achieving this overarching, common goal 
(Monteiro et al. 2015, 10–12; Davis 2015, 47–8).
However, if we now look at the last swing of this dialectic pendulum, critics are 
likely to express doubt as to such “transhistorical levelings”, emphasizing that, 
while the notion of “skillful means” can, indeed, be found in certain Buddhist 
traditions, it is (even in Mahāyāna) limited to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas––and 
it is far from certain whether someone who has received a certificate to teach 
meditation after a six- or eight-week training course would fall into that category 
(Purser 2015a, 37). Moreover, Theravāda tradition finds the Mahāyāna concept of 
upāya problematic for several reasons, not least because it can be readily misused 
to provide doctrinal support for unbridled violence (ibid., 39). Victoria (2006) 
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and Sharf (1993) have, for instance, shown how Mahāyāna teachings have been 
(mis)appropriated in the past by the Japanese government to support its aggres-
sive nationalist politics. Second, while it may be true that both contemporary 
and traditional approaches aim at “reducing suffering”, the traditional Buddhist 
conception of “suffering” tends to be much broader than the one put forward by 
most contemporary MBIs. For instance, Purser maintains that it is possible to 
distinguish three “forms” or “levels” of suffering in traditional Buddhist accounts: 
(a) the suffering of suffering (Pāli dukkha-dukkha): a “gross level of suffering” per-
taining to the unpleasantness of birth, illness, old age, and dying, and to anxiety, 
depression, and pain that usually accompany these ineliminable aspects of human 
existence; (b) the suffering of change (Pāli viparinama-dukkha): a “second-level” suf-
fering related to the realization of the transitory and impermanent nature of all 
phenomena; and (c) the suffering of conditioned existence or all-pervasive suffering 
(Pāli sankhara-dukkha): a “third-level” of suffering, characterized by “deep exis-
tential suffering, or angst”, a “sense of lack” or a “primal fear that [one’s] self may 
be groundless, empty, and devoid of permanent and separate identity” (Purser 
2015b, 680–1). From the Theravāda perspective, contemporary MBIs recognize 
and address only the first form of suffering, whereas they are largely ignorant of 
the remaining two forms. However, in order to prevent, and ultimately subdue, the 
pangs of existential fire, it will not do to simply extinguish the flames (a); one also 
needs to remove the embers (b) and the tinder (c). In other words, MBIs may pro-
vide for an epistemological shift, but not for an ontological one––they can engender 
changes in behaviour based on a more appreciative and aesthetically open stance 
towards one’s ordinary experience, but they do not lead to a radical transformation 
in one’s mode of being, because there is “no radical questioning of the nature of 
what we hold to be true” (ibid., 681). The practitioner thus remains the “prisoner 
of her own self ”, which can, in the long run, even exacerbate her suffering, as she 
becomes confronted with the (subconscious, etc.) material that has previously re-
mained hidden, and has no means to successfully cope with it.
The Dark Night of the Soul: Mindfulness and Suffering
Reflections on the forms or levels of suffering bring us to our next topic, the 
question of whether mindfulness meditation can be “dangerous”. It has recently 
been suggested (Dobkin et al. 2011; Rocha 2014) that the common conception 
of mindfulness meditation as a harmless relaxation and/or attention-enhancing 
technique might be problematic, as it can sometimes be accompanied by un-
pleasant psychophysical phenomena. What is striking in contemporary discus-
sions, however, is that this topic hardly ever gets mentioned––despite the fact that 
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traditional meditation manuals and the spiritual biographies of meditation experts 
often contain very elaborate accounts of such painful and frightening experiences.
In Theravāda Buddhism, for instance, the meditator is said to go through seven 
stages of purification (Pāli satta-visuddhi), some of which are described in very un-
pleasant terms. During the sixth stage (“purification by knowledge and vision of 
the way;” Pāli patipada-ñanadassana-visuddhi) the practitioner has to acquire nine 
“knowledges.” Upon acquiring the third knowledge3,4––“awareness of fearfulness” 
(“knowledge of appearance of as terror”; Pāli bhayatupatthana-ñana)––the medita-
tor realizes that all phenomena are continually “breaking apart” (dissolving), and is 
thus “gripped by fear and seems helpless” (Sayādaw 1995, 16). Upon acquiring the 
fourth knowledge––“knowledge of misery” (“knowledge of danger”; Pāli adinavan-
upassana-ñana)––all phenomena seem “insipid, without a vitalizing factor, and un-
satisfying”; the meditator sees “only suffering, only unsatisfactoriness, only misery” 
(ibid.). Upon acquiring the fifth knowledge––“knowledge of disgust” (“knowledge 
of dispassion”; Pāli nibbidanupassana-ñana)––the meditator “finds no delight in 
those miserable things but is entirely disgusted with them”; at times, his mind be-
comes “discontented and listless […] [e]ven if he directs his thought to the happiest 
sort of life and existence […] his mind will not take delight in them” (ibid., 16). And 
upon acquiring the sixth knowledge––“knowledge of desire for deliverance” (Pāli 
muncitukamyata-ñana)––the meditator experiences “painful feelings” in the body, 
coupled with “an unwillingness to remain long in one particular bodily posture”; his 
only wish is to forsake all these dissolving formations and escape from them (ibid.).
Similarly, in his short practical manual on vipassanā meditation, the already men-
tioned Mahāsi Sayādaw warns the reader that, during the training period, one 
may experience “unwholesome or frightening visions” (Sayādaw 1971, 1). In the 
initial stages, one may 
experience sensations of intense pain: stifling and choking sensations, 
such as pain from the slash of a knife, the thrust of a sharp-pointed in-
strument, unpleasant sensations of being pricked by sharp needles, or of 
small insects crawling over the body [… but also] sensations of itching, 
biting, intense cold (ibid., 7); 
3 I intentionally start with the third knowledge and omit the mention of the first two (i.e., “knowl-
edge of contemplation of rise and fall” [Pāli udayabbayanupassana-ñana] and “knowledge of con-
templation of dissolution” [Pāli bhanganupassana-ñana]), as they are irrelevant for our present pur-
poses.
4 Note that, for convenience’s sake, I’m using Mahāsī Sayādaw’s (1995) much more comprehensive 
descriptions of individual stages, which, however, follow the general account in The Path of Purifi-
cation (see Buddhaghosa 2011, 673–9).
70 Sebastjan Vörös: Sitting with the Demons...
in later stages, the meditator 
sometimes sees images of all kinds as if seeing them with his own eyes; 
for example, the Buddha comes into the scene in glorious radiance; a pro-
cession of monks in the sky; pagodas and images of the Buddha; meeting 
with beloved ones; trees or woods, hills or mountains, gardens, buildings; 
finding oneself face to face with bloated dead bodies or skeletons; swell-
ing of one’s body, covered with blood, falling into pieces and reduced to a 
mere skeleton; seeing in one’s body the entrails and vital organs and even 
germs; seeing the denizens of the hells and heavens. (ibid., 20)
Similar reports can be found in other Buddhist traditions. In Japanese Zen, for 
instance, such unpleasant phenomena are called makyō (literally, “devil’s cave”). A 
telling example are Hakuin’s (1686–1768) well-known descriptions of “medita-
tion” or “Zen sickness”––“an incurable disorder of the heart”––which plagued him 
on several occasions during his spiritual journey:
Before the month was out, my heart fire began to rise upwards against the 
natural course, parching my lungs of their essential fluids. My feet and 
legs were always ice-cold: they felt as though they were immersed in tubs 
of snow. There was a constant buzzing in my ears, as if I were walking 
beside a raging mountain torrent. I became abnormally weak and timid, 
shrinking and fearful in whatever I did. I felt totally drained, physically 
and mentally exhausted. Strange visions appeared to me during waking 
and sleeping hours alike. My armpits were always wet with perspiration. 
My eyes watered constantly. I traveled far and wide, visiting wise Zen 
teachers, seeking out noted physicians. But none of the remedies they 
offered brought any relief. (Hakuin 2010, 76) 
Even more interestingly, similar accounts can be found not only in Buddhism, 
but also in other contemplative traditions, such as Christian mysticism. In fact, 
the phrase “dark night of the soul” was originally coined by the Spanish Christian 
mystic St. John of the Cross (1542–1591), who characterized it as the most “ob-
scure and dark and terrible purgation” ( John of the Cross 1946, 75), identical to “a 
living death of the Cross, both as to sense and as to spirit––that is, both inwardly 
and outwardly” (ibid., 140). Similarly, to name one last example, in an anonymous 
contemplative manual from the fourteenth century called The Cloud of Unknowing 
we read that, during later stages of contemplative prayer, “[w]ondefully is a man’s 
affection varied in ghostly feeling”:
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For at the first time that a soul looketh thereupon, it shall find all the 
special deeds of sin that ever he did since he was born, bodily or ghostly 
[…] Sometime in this travail him think that it is to look thereupon as on 
hell; for him think that he despaireth to win to perfection of ghostly rest 
out of that pain. Thus far inwards come many, but for greatness of pain 
that they feel and for lacking of comfort, they go back in beholding of 
bodily things […]. (The Cloud 1922, 112)
Despite these and countless other accounts in traditional contemplative manuals, 
very few studies have been published on the unpleasant phenomena encountered 
during or after meditative practice, and even these centre mostly on clinical cas-
es (Castillo 1990; Epstein and Lieff 1981; Kuijpers et al. 2007; Manocha 2000; 
Shapiro 1992). To my knowledge, only two (meta)studies (Dobkin et al. 2011; 
Lustyk et al. 2009) have been published so far that deal with the potential “side 
effects” or “contraindications” of MBIs, but even here most of the data is derived 
from the clinical studies mentioned above. In general, the following “complica-
tions” have been reported: anxiety and affective disorders, confusion and diso-
rientation, depersonalization and derealization, depression, pain, insomnia and 
appetite loss, even short-term psychotic episodes. Both Dobkin et al. (2011) and 
Lustyk et al. (2009) point out that most reports contain little or no information on 
the nature and intensity of the meditative technique used, context in which it was 
performed, or the medical history of the practitioner. Further, the results of differ-
ent studies sometimes conflict with each other: for example, while some studies 
imply that meditation can contribute to the onset of depersonalization (Castillo 
1990; Shapiro 1992) and psychosis (Kuijpers et al. 2007; Manocha 2000), others 
suggest that it might be helpful in alleviating both conditions (see Chadwick et 
al. 2005 for psychosis, and Michal et al. 2007 for depersonalization). However, 
researchers agree that such phenomena merit further study, preferably with the 
aim of developing screening methods that would help to identify people who are 
more susceptible to such complications, and effecting intervention strategies that 
would enable more productive coping mechanisms.
The first steps in this direction were taken by Willoughby Britton, an assistant 
professor of psychiatry and human behaviour at Brown University and founder of 
the project called “Dark Night”, later renamed “The Varieties of Contemplative 
Experience”, whose aim is to systematically collect, analyze, and publicize reports 
on “challenging, difficult, or impairing” experiences (Cheetah House) that might 
occur during or after meditation practice. Relatedly, Prof. Britton runs the so-
called “Cheetah House”, a kind of “safe house” for people who have had any type 
of unpleasant experience with meditation. For example, David, “a polite, articulate 
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27-year old” came to the Cheetah House in 2013, having experienced a (semi)
psychotic breakdown during a prolonged meditative retreat. Several days into the 
retreat, he was flooded by “increasingly vivid pornographic fantasies and repressed 
memories from childhood”: “I just started freaking out […] and at some point, 
I just surrendered to the onslaught of unwanted sexual thoughts.” He has devel-
oped frightful paranoid thoughts telling him to kill himself, coupled with visions 
of “death with a scythe and a hood” (Rocha 2014). Unfortunately, except for a 
handful of interviews and conference presentations, Britton has not yet published 
her research in any peer-reviewed academic journal. From a methodological and 
organizational perspective, the project seems very promising, since it includes not 
only psychiatrists and neuroscientists, but also teachers of mindfulness meditation 
from both traditional and contemporary perspectives (among them, one finds the 
pioneers of the “mindfulness movement”, such as Kornfield and Goldstein). It 
is important to note, however, that Britton does not see her work as discrediting 
mindfulness meditation and/or MBIs––after all, she has not only been a long-
term practitioner herself, but is also a licensed MBSR therapist. Instead, she sees 
it as an opportunity to obtain a more accurate picture of the studied phenome-
na. She is particularly interested in getting a better understanding of whether it 
is possible to distinguish between challenging experiences that are constitutive 
of the contemplative path from those that could be labelled as anomalous (i.e., 
pathological).
Mindfulness Re- or De-contextualized?
In these last two sections, I will try to weave the two narratives together by putting 
forward the following claim: that traditionally-minded critiques of contemporary 
mindfulness approaches are ultimately correct, but for the wrong reasons. I will start 
with the second (i.e., negative) part of the claim. To get a sense as to why critics 
might be wrong when they dismiss contemporary approaches as ahistorical aber-
rations, it is important to remember that “the Buddhist tradition is not monolith-
ic” but “exhibits great diversity” (Dunne 2011, 71–72), and that there is therefore 
“no single authoritative Buddhist account of mindfulness” (ibid. 2015, 252). In 
other words, although it might be true that there are important differences be-
tween contemporary approaches to mindfulness and certain strands of Buddhism 
(notably, those related to the Theravāda Buddhism), this does not mean that there 
are no alternative conceptions of mindfulness within Buddhism (notably, those 
developed in Northern and East Asian Buddhism), which may align more closely 
with contemporary approaches.
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Dunne exemplifies this point by arranging Buddhist traditions along what might 
be called an innateist/constructivist spectrum (Dunne 2011, 75–79). The proposed 
classificatory criterion concerns the following question: “[W]hat is the continuity 
between an ordinary mind and the mind of a Buddha? [T]o what extent are the 
qualities of buddhahood or awakening (bodhi) present in an ordinary person?” 
(ibid., 75)
On the one end of the spectrum, we find constructivists who maintain that very 
few qualities of awakening are present, and that progress along the Buddhist path 
entails “eliminating obstructions” and “carefully acquiring or constructing appro-
priate qualities that eventually result in buddhahood”. On the other end of the 
spectrum, we find innateists who argue that most or even all qualities of awakening 
are present, and that progress along the path requires “eliminating the obscura-
tions that prevent our innate buddhahood from emerging” (ibid., 75–76; emphases 
added). According to this classification, Theravāda Buddhism, along with its clas-
sical conception of mindfulness, falls squarely in the constructivist camp; but there 
are other approaches––found particularly, but not exclusively, in the Mahāmudrā 
and Dzogchen traditions of Tibet, as well as in Chinese Chan, Japanese Zen and 
Korean Seon (Dunne 2015, 259; Sharf 2014b, 944)––that diverge significantly 
from the Theravāda views.
Both innateist and constructivist approaches start off from the general framework 
of the Four Noble Truths, as described in the first section, but disagree on the 
origin of “craving” or “desire” (Skt. tr �s�ṇā), i.e., on the root cause of suffering (the 
Second Noble Truth). For constructivists, craving ultimately stems from distorted 
cognitions. The main goal of the Buddhist path (the Fourth Noble Truth) is thus 
to eradicate distorted cognitions (e.g., our belief in the permanence of things or 
the existence of the autonomous self ) and replace them with wholesome qualities 
and capacities (e.g., compassion, clear comprehension) (Dunne 2015, 255). For 
innateists, on the other hand, the root of suffering lies deeper and has to do with 
the fundamental distinction between subject and object, i.e., with the notion of “a dis-
tinct subjectivity standing over against distinct objects of experience” (ibid., 259). 
It is this duality of knowing subject vs. known object (Skt. grāhyagrāhakadvaya) 
that is said to be the ultimate source of distorted cognitions and consequently of 
craving and suffering in general. Cessation of suffering cannot be attained by the 
(progressive) eradication of unwholesome mental states and cultivation of whole-
some ones, but by the (sudden) realization of the state of non-dual wisdom (Skt. 
advayajñāna) which is continually (if dimly) present in our everyday experience 
in the form of reflexive awareness (Skt. svasam�vitti) (Dunne 2011, 73; Dunne 
2015, 261). Unlike the classical “constructivist” accounts, where all conscious 
states, including all liberative meditative states, necessarily have a subject-object 
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structure, the “innateist” approaches tend to emphasize the importance of states 
that precede, and thus transcend, the dual mode of experiencing.
It is for this reason that Maitrīpa (eleventh century), one of the most important 
proponents of Mahāmudrā tradition in Indian Buddhism, argues that what needs 
to be cultivated in meditation is not mindfulness (Skt. smr �ti) and attention (Skt. 
manasikāra), but rather non-mindfulness (Skt. asmr �ti) and non-attention (Skt. ama-
nasikāra) (Dunne 2011, 77). As such, if according to the classical (“constructivist”) 
Theravāda account, mindfulness comprises evaluative, judgmental and recollective 
aspects, then according to the non-dualist (“innateist”) account, these aspects stay 
rooted in the subject-object duality and are therefore constitutive of ignorance 
(Skt. avidyā) (ibid. 2015, 262–3). Put differently, according to Mahāmudrā, cul-
tivating mindfulness (in the classical sense of the term) strengthens subject-object 
structure and exacerbates suffering (ibid. 2011, 77). Consequently, the practical 
instructions provided by the adept Karmapa Wanchûg Dorjé (sixteenth century) 
sound remarkably similar to those found in contemporary approaches: “Do not 
pursue the past. Do not usher in the future. Rest evenly without present aware-
ness, clear and nonconceptual.” (ibid., 80) The meditator is asked to cultivate pres-
ent-centered awareness, not allowing herself to get caught up in thoughts about the 
past or future, and to stop all conceptualizations, be it of the past, present or future, 
and simply rest in the state of clear awareness (ibid., 81).
Similarly, the most radically innateist currents in the early Chan movement argued 
that, instead of “maintaining mind”, “discerning mind” and “mindfulness”, as sug-
gested by the more “moderate” (i.e., “constructivist-friendly”) Chan advocates, one 
should cultivate “no mind” (Chin. wuxin), “cutting off discernment” (Chin. jueguan), 
and even, in a manner reminiscent of the Mahāmudrā tradition, “absence” (Chin. 
wusuo) and “no mindfulness” (!) (Chin. wunian) (Sharf 2014b, 945, 951). In other 
words, one should break completely with the constructivist tendencies of classical 
approaches. For instance, in the Treatise on No Mind (Chin. Wuxin lun) we read:
There is no mind. […] You must simply observe intently and carefully: 
[…] Is this in fact the mind or not? Is it inside or outside, or somewhere 
in between? As long as one looks for the mind in any of these three lo-
cations, one’s search will end in failure. Indeed, searching for it anywhere 
will end in failure. That’s exactly what is known as “no mind”. (ibid., 946)
And in reply to a query as to how one should practice no-mind, we find the fol-
lowing admonition: “Simply be wakeful with respect to all phenomena. ‘No mind’ 
itself is practice. There is no practice. Thus know that no mind is everything, and 
quiescent extinction is itself no mind.” (ibid., 947)
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So, where does this leave us? It would seem that, although diverging substantial-
ly from the (“constructivist”) Theravāda account, contemporary approaches have 
close affinities to non-dualist (“innateist”) views on mindfulness as propounded 
in certain Northern and East-Asian traditions. And if we are willing to cede “au-
thenticity” to the latter, as we should, there is no reason to deny it to the former 
(Dunne 2015, 253). The most radical accusations of the “traditionalist” camp thus 
seem to rest on shaky grounds. But does this mean that their criticism is completely 
off the mark? Far from it. Note that, in addition to the nature and dynamics of the 
formal meditation practice, we must also consider the nature and dynamics of the 
informal or “in-between” practice, i.e., general guidelines on how to live (think, act, 
etc.) in the period between two formal sessions, so as to establish an environment 
conducive to the aims and objectives of contemplative practice (Dunne 2015; 
Kirmayer 2015). And here we do find telling differences between contemporary 
and traditional innateist approaches.
For example, a practitioner who wants to engage in formal Mahāmudrā practice 
is first required to undergo intensive training in “preliminary practices”, which 
are then also rehearsed at the beginning of every meditation session. The main 
purpose of these practices is to instill “an intense concern for the suffering of 
[oneself and] others and a strong motivation to become capable of relieving that 
suffering” (Dunne 2015, 166). Also, as a part of the overall Mahāmudrā tradition, 
the practitioner is required to adopt “a paradigm of the proper Buddhist life along 
with its ethical norms” (ibid.). Although this paradigm, in contradistinction to the 
Theravāda tradition, is set aside during formal practice, this is only because it is be-
lieved that between formal sessions the specific nature of meditative practice will 
facilitate the fruition of goals and values that are central to a wholesome Buddhist 
lifestyle. There thus exists a delicate balance between formal and informal aspects 
of the practice: even the most “iconoclastic” among the traditional innateist ap-
proaches, i.e., approaches that eschew all conceptuality and normativity in formal 
practice, are embedded in a specific framework that provides the whole endeavour, at 
least initially, with purpose, orientation, and meaning. Put simply, even if we claim 
that, in the end, language (conceptual structures, judgments, beliefs, etc.) has to be 
discarded or transcended, we need to account for this fact in and through language. 
In other words, even if the goal of our practice is radical de-construction, one needs 
first to construct a meaningful narrative that will re-construct our previous beliefs 
and opinions so that we may reorient ourselves and start working towards the 
newly set goal.
What is thus often lacking in discussions about the (in)appropriateness of con-
temporary approaches to mindfulness is a more nuanced take on what is actual-
ly meant by “context”. On the one hand, “context” can refer to the recollective, 
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evaluative, and so on aspects that are said to (not) be integral to the formal prac-
tice (“narrow context”). On the other hand, it can denote a broader framework of 
values, purposes, and meanings into which such formal meditation practices are 
embedded (“broad context”). Take, for instance, Kabat-Zinn’s MBSR. In his wish 
to produce a program that would “embody to whatever degree possible the dhar-
ma essence of the Buddha’s teachings put into action”, and make it accessible “to 
mainstream Americans facing stress, pain, and illness”, without being peremptori-
ly dismissed “as Buddhist, ‘New Age’, ‘Eastern Mysticism’ or just plain ‘flakey’, he 
probably did the right thing to opt for the more ‘innateist’ approach to Buddhist 
meditation” (Kabat-Zinn 2011, 282). In the scientistic climate of the 1970’s and 
1980’s, all attempts to incorporate Buddhist meditation, in its traditional form, 
into the medical establishment were doomed to failure. In order to make it more 
palatable to the mainstream scientific and therapeutic communities of the period, 
it had to be presented in a form that could be integrated into the post-Enlight-
enment, secularized, multicultural and multiconfessional Western societies of the 
late twentieth century: mindfulness meditation, construed in “minimalist” terms 
as “bare attention”, seemed more than fit for the task in this context.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the mechanisms and implications 
of such re-framing were inadequately reflected. For example, when Kabat-Zinn 
states that the aim of his work was simply to “share the essence of meditation and 
yoga practices”, and that the “American vocabulary” he used for this particular 
purpose “spoke to the heart of the matter, and didn’t focus on the cultural aspects 
of the traditions out of which the dharma emerged” (ibid., 287; emphases added), 
he gives the impression that contemporary conceptions of mindfulness constitute 
the neutral and universal essence of Buddhist meditation. Although it could be 
argued that this is not what Kabat-Zinn had in mind (at least not in such a crude 
and unqualified sense), as he explicitly points out that he never meant to 
exploit, fragment, or decontextualize the dharma, but rather to recon-
textualize [!] it within the frameworks of science, medicine […], and 
healthcare so that it would be maximally useful to people who could not 
hear it or enter it through the more traditional dharma gates (ibid., 288; 
emphasis in the original). 
However, Kabat-Zinn’s vague (and often contradictory) statements undoubtedly 
contributed to the rapid spread of such naïve views.
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Sitting with the Demons: Mindfulness and Existential 
Transformation
We have now come to the crux of the matter: what is problematic in contempo-
rary approaches is not their “innateist” understanding and practice of mindfulness 
meditation (narrow context), but rather their (implicit or explicit) belief that this 
form of practice constitutes the transhistorical “essence” of Buddhism, and that 
therefore other elements (broad context) can, and indeed should, be ignored. Since 
absolute decontextualization is an illusion and often simply masks (implicit, ten-
tative) recontextualization, critics make a valid point when they accuse contempo-
rary “universalist” conceptions of uncritically adopting beliefs, norms, and values 
predominant in Western culture: their unwillingness to constructively engage in a 
debate on what would be the most appropriate framework for mindfulness leads 
to an often wholesale (if tacit) acceptance of individualism, competitiveness, etc. 
that are typical of contemporary laissez-faire economies. The asymmetry between 
the narrow (formal) and broad (informal) context is vividly expressed by the fol-
lowing analogy: contemporary meditators, who tend to practice meditation with 
great devotion, but typically do not abide to ethical principles between meditation 
retreats, are likened to a “thief who after he gets caught hires a clever lawyer to get 
him out of trouble,” but as soon as he is free he starts stealing again (Ajahn Chah 
in Amaro 2015, 17). The exclusive focus on formal meditation can make us blind 
to large-scale (ethical, social, environmental, etc.) issues, and thereby perpetuate 
injustices inherent in the system whose norms and values we tacitly adopt.
But what would be a more appropriate framework for contemporary approaches? 
Our previous reflections on the “dark night of the soul” may provide a valuable 
key. Contemporary accounts that construe mindfulness meditation as a relaxa-
tion and/or attention-enhancing technique are bound to interpret the potentially 
painful and frightening phenomena that may occur in strictly negative terms––as 
aberrations, side effects, pathological conditions, etc.––, even though classical man-
uals often depict them as constitutive of meditative practice. Traditional accounts, 
on the other hand, provide elaborate descriptions and classifications of such phe-
nomena, but are so strongly embedded in their specific (religious, mythical, etc.) 
discourse that they may seem far removed from concerns of the contemporary 
reader. In other words, if contemporary approaches lack a comprehensive nar-
rative that would provide a meaningful link between mindfulness and “contem-
plative suffering”, traditional approaches often seem too exotic or far-fetched to 
be readily integrated into contemporary (psychological, psychotherapeutic, phil-
osophical, etc.) discourse. In the long run, this might have a deleterious effect 
on the overall attitude towards mindfulness meditation. For example, the rapid 
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spread of meditative techniques (without proper guidance, know-how, etc.) and 
consequent rise in “unwanted side effects” may instigate a shift from the mythiza-
tion phase, in which mindfulness is presented as a panacea for all the ills and evils 
of contemporary society, to the demonization phase, in which it will be stigmatized 
as something too unpredictable and hazardous for clinical purposes. The rise and 
fall of enthusiasm for the therapeutic use of hallucinogenic drugs in the 1960s and 
1970s is a telling (if extreme) example of how easily the pendulum can swing the 
other way.
It seems to me very unlikely that these potentially deleterious trends could be 
checked by a wholesale adoption of the classical Buddhist framework, as suggested 
by the more traditionally-minded critics. Instead, a two-step strategy might prove 
more efficient. First, it is important to acknowledge and accept the indispensabil-
ity of broader contextual factors, i.e., the fact that there is no context-free “essence” 
of mindfulness meditation, and that mindfulness constitutes but one element in 
the overall philosophical (spiritual, etc.) edifice. Secondly, greater care should be 
taken in examining and choosing the appropriate frameworks (yes, plural––for 
why should there be only one legitimate framework?) for contemporary recontextu-
alization of such practices. After all, and as pointed out by Davis, questions about 
what constitutes “right” (wholesome, etc.) mindfulness should not revolve around 
doctrinal orthodoxy, but rather around the question of what constitutes a good 
(wholesome, meaningful) life (Davis 2015, 47). In this sense it may be wise, first 
and foremost, to consider the possibility not of doctrinal or ethical (at least not in 
the sense of deontological ethics) (re)contextualization, but instead of existential 
(re)contextualization: how to meaningfully incorporate mindfulness meditation 
into the broader search for existential meaning at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. One of the central threads in this existential and more mindful (!) (re)
framing of mindfulness, a thread closely intertwined with our discussion of the 
“dark night of the soul”, could be a gradual expansion of our current understanding 
of suffering so as to include not only “standard” mental afflictions (anxiety, depres-
sion, etc.; i.e., Pāli dukkha-dukkha), but also deeper existential concerns––concerns 
pertaining to the changing, impermanent, and transitory nature of ourselves and 
the world (i.e., Pāli viparinama-dukkha and sankhara-dukkha), the alleviation of 
which calls not only for minor epistemological shifts, but for radical ontologi-
cal transformation. In this respect, whether a certain affliction constitutes a “dark 
night of the soul” or not would depend on whether it is ultimately constitutive for 
instantiating this profound transformation of one’s manner of being or not.
It is perhaps somewhat unfortunate that mindfulness originally struck roots in 
the milieu of behavioural and cognitive therapies. For while such therapies prove 
to be efficient in (at least short-term) reduction of psychological distress, their 
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individualistic and biomedical conceptions of human nature generally deprive 
them of the resources needed to adequately thematize and address deeper exis-
tential issues. For this reason, it might be worthwhile to examine possibilities for 
embedding mindfulness into contexts that show greater sensitivity to existential 
dimensions, e.g. Frankl’s logotherapy, Fromm’s humanistic psychoanalysis, and Ya-
lom’s and May’s existential therapies. What all these approaches have in common 
is not only a keener appreciation for fundamental existential concerns (dying, suf-
fering, angst, etc.), but also the conviction that these concerns can be appropriately 
dealt with only by letting go of the atomized, individualistic conceptions of human 
existence, and by focusing on establishing and maintaining authentic relations with 
the world and others. This would provide mindfulness-based techniques with a 
framework that is much closer to the original Buddhist framework of the Four 
Noble Truths, and would therefore enable practitioners to construe and practice 
meditation in terms not only of symptom-reduction, but also of profound (and 
often quite painful) existential transformation on both individual and social levels.
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